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Who	gets	the	blame?	How	policymakers	in	the	EU
shift	responsibility	when	things	go	wrong
EU	membership	provides	ample	opportunities	for	politicians	at	the	national	level	to	shift	blame	for
unpopular	decisions	to	the	EU’s	institutions,	while	EU-level	actors	also	have	an	incentive	to	blame
national	politicians	when	things	go	wrong.	Drawing	on	a	new	study,	Tim	Heinkelmann-Wild	explains
how	these	blame-avoidance	processes	function	in	practice.
When	EU	policies	are	publicly	contested,	policymakers	try	to	avoid	blame	by	downplaying	their	own
responsibility	and	emphasising	the	responsibility	of	others.	EU	member	states	and	EU	institutions	thus	have	a
strong	incentive	to	engage	in	multi-level	blame	games.	For	example,	during	the	Eurozone	crisis,	Greek	politicians
repeatedly	blamed	the	EU	for	the	harsh	economic	conditions	they	had	to	fulfil	under	the	European	rescue
programmes,	while	EU	officials	attributed	responsibility	for	the	country’s	disastrous	financial	situation	to	Greek
politicians.
Greek	politicians	also	blamed	Germany	for	the	severe	conditions	they	had	to	fulfil	under	the	European	rescue
programmes,	while	German	politicians	highlighted	the	responsibility	of	policymakers	in	Greece.	At	the	same	time,
the	European	Court	of	Auditors	strongly	criticised	the	European	Commission’s	failure	to	notice	the	warning	signs	in
the	run-up	to	the	crisis	and	the	Commission’s	handling	of	the	subsequent	state	bailouts.	This	begs	the	question:
who	blames	whom	in	European	blame	games?
Preferences	and	opportunities
Existing	research	on	blame-shifting	in	the	EU	focuses	either	on	policymakers’	preferences	or	the	opportunities
offered	by	institutional	structures	in	which	policymakers	operate.	While	this	scholarship	offers	important	insights,
blame-shifting,	like	any	other	social	behaviour,	is	shaped	by	a	combination	of	the	actors’	preferences	and	their
opportunities.	An	explanation	of	blame-shifting	in	the	EU	therefore	needs	to	integrate	both	policymakers’
preferences	(‘Who	do	I	want	to	blame?’)	as	well	as	their	opportunities	to	realise	them	(‘Who	can	I	blame?’).
Firstly,	policymakers	at	each	level	of	the	EU’s	multi-level	governance	system	have	a	preference	for	shifting	blame
onto	policymakers	at	the	other	level	for	two	mutually	reinforcing	reasons:	loyalty	and	interdependence.	Due	to	the
frequency	of	their	meetings,	loyalty	among	policymakers	at	the	same	level	is	often	much	stronger	than	loyalty
between	policymakers	at	different	levels	of	government.	This	mutual	loyalty	deters	them	from	shifting	blame	onto
one	another.
For	example,	the	loyalty	among	members	of	the	Commission	is	much	stronger	than	their	loyalty	to	member	state
representatives.	Their	frequent	meetings	create	mutual	loyalty	that	deters	them	from	shifting	blame	onto	one
another,	a	deterrence	that	does	not	exist	to	the	same	extent	vis-à-vis	national	policymakers.	At	the	same	time,	the
loyalty	among	member	states	frequently	exceeds	their	loyalty	to	EU	actors.	National	ministers	typically	respect
each	other	more	than	members	of	the	Commission.	While	this	bond	tends	to	deter	them	from	blaming	each	other
for	contested	EU	policies,	there	is	nothing	similar	to	deter	them	from	blaming	the	EU	itself	and	those	representing
EU	actors.
Moreover,	policymakers	from	the	same	level	often	depend	on	one	another	more	than	on	policymakers	from	other
levels.	For	example,	as	member	states	depend	on	each	other	for	decision-making	in	the	Council	much	more	than
on	the	Commission,	they	have	to	exercise	more	caution	in	blaming	each	other	than	in	blaming	the	Commission.	By
contrast,	as	Commission	bureaucrats	depend	much	more	on	their	standing	in	Brussels	than	on	their	reputation
among	national	governments,	they	will	be	more	cautious	about	shifting	blame	onto	other	EU	institutions	than	about
blaming	member	states.
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Secondly,	policymakers	can	shift	blame	according	to	their	preferences	only	in	so	far	as	the	institutional	structure
provides	them	the	opportunity	to	plausibly	deny	responsibility	when	shifting	blame	onto	others.	At	first	glance,	the
complex	multi-level	governance	system	of	the	EU	seems	to	offer	policymakers	plausible	deniability	and	widespread
opportunities	for	blame-shifting.	Yet,	blame-shifting	opportunities	in	the	EU	are	not	only	shaped	by	policymaking
structures,	but	also	by	the	structures	of	policy-implementation.	If	policymakers	are	responsible	for	‘on	the	ground’
implementation,	they	are	likely	to	be	associated	with	the	contested	policy	and	become	a	focal	point	for	the	public.
As	a	consequence,	other	policymakers’	attempts	to	shift	blame	onto	implementing	actors	are	facilitated	while	blame
attributions	to	non-implementing	actors	become	implausible	in	the	eyes	of	the	public.
Who	blames	whom?
The	combination	of	policymakers’	preferences	and	their	opportunities	thus	shapes	European	blame	games.	Firstly,
the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	is	high	when	the	institutional	structures	of	policy-implementation
allow	member	states	to	follow	their	preference	for	shifting	blame	onto	the	EU.	This	is	the	case	when	policies	are
either	implemented	by	EU-level	authorities	or	do	not	require	active	implementation.
Secondly,	the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	is	moderate	when	either	national-level	actors	or	EU
actors	are	heavily	constrained	by	the	institutional	structures	to	pursue	their	preferences.	This	is	the	case	for
member	states	when	policies	are	implemented	by	member	state	authorities	and	for	EU	institutions	when	policies
are	enacted	by	EU-level	authorities.	Finally,	the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	will	be	low	when	the
structures	of	policy-implementation	allow	EU	institutions	to	follow	their	preference	for	shifting	blame	onto	member
states.	This	will	be	the	case	when	the	policy	is	either	implemented	by	national-level	authorities	or	does	not	require
active	implementation.
The	blame	games	accompanying	three	contested	migration	policies	are	illustrative	in	this	regard.	Figure	1	shows
blame	attributions	by	EU	member	states	and	EU	institutions	for	EU	border	controls,	the	EU	asylum	system,	and	the
welfare	entitlements	for	EU	citizens	at	their	country	of	residence.
Figure	1:	Shares	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU
Note:	For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	(co-authored	with	Bernhard	Zangl)	in	Governance.
Firstly,	the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	is	high	when	the	institutional	structures	of	policy-
implementation	allow	member	states	to	follow	their	preference	for	shifting	blame	onto	the	EU.	Member	states
attributed	the	bulk	of	blame	to	the	EU	in	the	border	control	case	(77	per	cent),	where	the	policy	was	implemented	by
the	EU	agency	Frontex.	Member	states	also	assigned	the	vast	majority	of	their	blame	to	the	EU	in	the	welfare
entitlement	case	(87	per	cent),	where	the	policy	does	not	require	active	implementation.
Secondly,	the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	is	moderate	when	policies	are	implemented	by	actors
located	at	the	same	level	of	government	as	the	blame	sender.	EU	institutions	attributed	36	per	cent	of	their	blame	in
the	border	control	case	to	EU-level	actors,	while	20	per	cent	of	member	states’	blame	attributions	were	directed	at
EU	actors	in	the	asylum	system	case.
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Finally,	the	share	of	blame	attributions	targeting	the	EU	is	low	when	the	institutional	structures	of	policy-
implementation	allow	EU	institutions	to	follow	their	preference	for	shifting	blame	onto	member	states.	Only	a	few
blame	attributions	by	EU	institutions	targeted	other	EU-level	actors	in	the	asylum	system	case	(7	per	cent),	where
the	policy	is	implemented	by	national-level	authorities,	as	well	as	in	the	welfare	entitlements	case	(4	per	cent),
where	the	policy	does	not	require	active	implementation.
To	sum	up,	European	blame	games	are	shaped	by	a	combination	of	policymakers’	preferences	and	their
opportunities.	Due	to	their	loyalty	and	interdependence,	policymakers	located	at	the	same	level	of	government	tend
to	share	a	preference	for	shifting	blame	onto	actors	at	the	other	level.	Policymakers’	opportunities	to	shift	blame
according	to	this	preference	are	constrained	by	the	prevalent	structures	of	policy-implementation.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	(co-authored	with	Bernhard	Zangl)	in
Governance
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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